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ABSTRACT 6 
 7 
Agri-environmental schemes (AES) have had a limited effect on European agriculture 8 
due to farmers’ reluctance to participate. Information on how farmers react when AES 9 
characteristics are modified can be an important input to the design of such policies. 10 
This paper investigates farmers’ preferences for different design options in a specific 11 
AES aimed at encouraging nitrogen fixing crops in marginal dry-land areas in Spain. 12 
We use a choice experiment survey conducted in two regions (Aragón and Andalusia). 13 
The analysis employs an error component random parameter logit model allowing for 14 
preference heterogeneity and correlation amongst the non-Status Quo alternatives. 15 
Farmers show a strong preference for maintaining their current management strategies; 16 
however significant savings in cost or increased participation can be obtained by 17 
modifying some AES attributes.  18 
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 2 
1. INTRODUCTION 29 
Agri-environmental schemes (AES) are the main policy instrument in the European 30 
Union designed to foster improvements in the relationship between agriculture and the 31 
environment (European Commission, 2005). A typical AES requires farmers to modify 32 
farming practices in exchange for a per-hectare payment. This payment is calculated 33 
using a supply-side approach, considering the income forgone or the additional costs 34 
associated with scheme requirements. The substantial public expenditure needed to fund 35 
these schemes (Є6.8 billion in the EU’s 2007-2013 budget) has motivated a wide range 36 
of research aimed at both evaluating and improving their performance.  37 
 38 
The voluntary nature of AES means that farmers’ decisions to participate, with 39 
appropriate distribution across target areas, is central to achieving policy objectives. 40 
While there has been a considerable research interest in identifying the factors that 41 
influence participation (e.g. Siebert et al., 2006), most studies are based on actual 42 
participation behaviour rather than on contingent behaviour. A drawback of this 43 
approach is that farmers’ decisions to participate are considered subsequent to the 44 
design of the AES. As a result, there is typically insufficient variation in scheme 45 
attributes to allow the impact of scheme design on participation to be examined.  46 
 47 
To overcome this limitation, this study uses a choice experiment (CE) approach to 48 
investigate farmers’ex-ante preferences for key elements of AES design, such as the 49 
amount of land enrolled, grazing regime, provision of technical advisory services, and 50 
payment levels. By including payment as one of the attributes, the public expenditure 51 
needed for each new design can be estimated. Modelling farmers’ choices allows us to 52 
estimate how they would trade-off different levels of these contract attributes against 53 
per hectare payments. Knowledge of such trade-offs can inform AES policy design. In 54 
addition, this approach allows us to estimate the compensating premiums needed for 55 
farmers to participate in specific schemes combining different attributes. This enables 56 
an informed assessment of relative budgetary costs.  57 
 58 
This paper contributes to literature in two main ways. For AES adoption, this is one of 59 
two studies which have considered the role of scheme design on farmers’ participation, 60 
and hence on reducing implementation costs. Although a few studies have been 61 
conducted using CE to evaluate farmer behaviour (e.g. Peterson et al., 2007; Ruto et al., 62 
2008; Roessler et al., 2007; Birol et al., 2006; Scarpa et al., 2003), only one has focused 63 
on AES design (Ruto and Garrod, 2009). Ruto and Garrod pool responses from surveys 64 
covering a wide range of AES and use a payment attribute defined as a change in the 65 
premium level. In contrast, we focus on one scheme and use actual payments, which 66 
allows us to estimate willingness to accept (WTA). In addition, we account explicitly 67 
for preference heterogeneity and the impact of farmer characteristics on WTA estimates 68 
for AES attributes. The analysis employs, simultaneously, the error component 69 
approach to account for correlation among the non-Status Quo (SQ) alternatives and the 70 
random parameter approach to the attributes (Scarpa et al., 2007). 71 
 72 
The paper is structured as follows: a brief description of the choice experiment design 73 
and the case study is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents the econometric 74 
specification followed by the results in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in the final 75 
section.  76 
  77 
 3 
2. CASE STUDY DESCRIPTION 78 
Data was obtained from an in-person survey of three hundred farmers undertaken in two 79 
regions in Spain (200 in Aragón and 100 in Andalusia) during June-August 2008. The 80 
two regions represent low yield rain fed cereal production and semi-extensive ovine 81 
farming systems and were selected partly to facilitate investigation of regional 82 
differences in preferences for AES attributes. The AES selected as most suitable to 83 
provide the framework for this case study was “introduction of nitrogen fixing crops in 84 
dry land areas” (NFC). This scheme was proposed in both Aragón and Andalusia Rural 85 
Development Programs (RDP) for 2007-2013
2
. The main characteristics of NFC are 86 
presented in Table 1. The measure closely resembles the Alternative Crop Measure 87 
(ACM) scheme included in the 2000-2006 RDP for Aragón but not in the RDP for 88 
Andalusia.  89 
 
Table 1. Main Characteristics of nitrogen fixing crop agri-environmental scheme 
Eligibility 
 Non permanent rain fed arable land 
Requirements 
 Cultivate alfalfa (nitrogen fixing crop) during a period of 5 years 
 Implementation of a farm management plan 
 Rotate the crop after five years 
Compensation 
 100 Euros per hectare and year 
Environmental benefit 
 Reduce fire risk due to green cover presence in summer period 
 Increase nitrogen soil content 
 Habitat preservation for birds 
 90 
 91 
The choice of attributes and levels for the choice experiment is based on a combination 92 
of evidence from the literature and on information from a previous study that 93 
investigated factors affecting farmers’ adoption of AES in the two case study areas 94 
(Barreiro-Hurlé et al., 2008). An attribute related to the area enrolled is included since 95 
environmental scientists suggest that habitat should be provided with a minimum 96 
surface to assure viability. Therefore a compulsory enrolment of 50% of eligible area 97 
attribute level is included in order to identify the potential cost it would entail. Grazing 98 
restriction plays a significant role in the study areas as the production of rain-fed cereals 99 
is closely linked to extensive ovine production (Gómez de Molina, 2002). Therefore the 100 
attribute grazing is allowed to take the level "no restriction" to identify the impact it 101 
would have on the sign-up decision. The relevance of fixed costs as a barrier for 102 
adoption, as put forward by Ducos et al. (2009) is also tested by introducing a fixed 103 
payment as part of the contract. The potential advantage of including technical 104 
assistance and monitoring in the AES is also evaluated. In order to estimate the WTA 105 
payments of the various AES design attributes, a monetary attribute related to payment 106 
level was included. The attributes and levels used to describe the AES in the choice 107 
experiment are described in Table 2.  108 
  109 
                                                 
2
 At the time of selecting the AES to provide the framework for this case study, the final RDP had not 
been adopted. In Andalusia the NFC was proposed in the draft available at the time, however the   
approved RDP excluded it.  
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 110 
Table 2. AES attributes and levels used in the CE design 
Attribute Description Levels Coding 
SUR 
Flexibility over the amount of land to be 
enrolled in the AES 
Free 1 
50% eligible surface 0 
GRAZING 
Flexibility over grazing in the land 
under the AES  
Free 1 
Limited * 0 
TTA 
Availability of a compulsory and free of 
charge technical training and advisory 
service 
No 0 
Yes 1 
FIXED_PREM 
Availability of a 1000 € one-off 
payment per contract independently of 
the area enrolled payable on the first 
year. 
Yes 1 
No 0 
PREMIUM Payment level per ha and year 
60 € ha-1 60 
80 € ha-1 80 
100 € ha-1 100 
120 € ha-1 120 
Levels in bold represent the AES currently available in Aragón RDP. 
* Period for which grazing is limited varies for each region in order to take into account the RDP specifications. For 
Aragón the limitation is from 01-08 to 30-09 and in Andalusia it is all year round.  
 111 
Considering the number of attributes and levels, a large number of AES profiles (96) 112 
can be constructed, resulting in 96
2
 combinations for a two-option choice set design. To 113 
create a more manageable number of options, the choice sets were restricted using 114 
Street and Burgess experimental design (Street and Burgess, 2007), which is based on 115 
D-z optimality criterion, obtaining 96 profiles and a D-efficiency of 91.3%
3
. In order to 116 
make the number of choice tasks manageable for respondents, the 96 choice sets were 117 
blocked into 16 versions of six choice sets in each block. In each choice set, farmers 118 
were asked to choose between two alternatives, allowing for a no choice (or Status Quo) 119 
option under which the farmer continues with his current practice. Table 3 shows a 120 
typical choice set presented to respondents in the survey. 121 
 122 
The questionnaire was designed by a research team after a thorough review of previous 123 
research, agricultural structure in the area and discussions with groups of farmers and 124 
government agency officials responsible for AES implementation. Before launching the 125 
main survey, the questionnaire was subjected to a pre-test with 10 farmers in each case 126 
study region and adjusted accordingly. The pre-test helped to ensure that respondents 127 
understood the questions and that the choice tasks were manageable. Apart from the 128 
choice experiment, basic information about the farm and respondent socio-economic 129 
and technical characteristics were also collected in the survey. The survey targeted 130 
farmers who were currently enrolled in AES (participants) and those who were not 131 
(non-participants). In the sampling strategy, however, there was a discretional 132 
overrepresentation of AES participants. In particular 27% of farmers in the Aragón 133 
sample are currently enrolled in the ACM AES, while the actual adoption rate in the 134 
region is 2.8% and in Andalusia 32% of the sample are AES participants while the 135 
actual adoption rate is 16.6%
4
.  136 
  137 
                                                 
3 The Status Quo (SQ) was not considered in the experimental design. Street and Burgess (2007) 
conclude that the same experimental design when “the SQ was not considered” is optimal when “the SQ 
option is adjoined in the choice cards”, albeit with some loss in experimental design efficiency.   
4
 This oversampling strategy will be taken into consideration by weighting the final welfare estimates. 
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 138 
Table 3. Example of a choice set (Aragón sample) 
 Alternative A Alternative B Alternative C 
Surface 
50 % eligible 
surface 
Free to choose 
Neither Alt A nor Alt 
B. I would maintain 
my current farm 
management 
Grazing in the enrolled surface Free 
Limited (not allowed 
between 01/08-30/09) 
Technical Advisory Service 
compulsory and free of charge 
No Yes 
 
Fixed Premium of 1000 € 
 
No Yes 
Premium level (€ ha-1 year-1) 60 80 
 139 
 140 
3. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 141 
Choice experiments are based on Lancaster’s theory of consumer choice which 142 
postulates that consumption decisions are determined by the utility or value that is 143 
derived from the attributes of the particular good being consumed (Lancaster, 1966). 144 
The econometric basis of the approach rests on the behavioural framework of random 145 
utility theory (McFadden, 1974). Statistical analyses of the responses obtained from CE 146 
can be used to derive the marginal values for attributes of a good or policy, in this case 147 
AES design attributes. In the model specification, two important issues are 148 
simultaneously taken into account: preference heterogeneity and positive correlation 149 
among non-Status-Quo alternatives.   150 
 151 
Preference heterogeneity has been taken into account in two ways. First, preferences 152 
could vary between the two regions. To test for differences between regions, individual 153 
multinomial logit models were estimated and subjected to a likelihood ratio test taking 154 
into consideration the scale parameter (Swait and Louviere, 1993). Equal attribute and 155 
scale parameters can be rejected at the 1% level ( 27 =386.7). Therefore two 156 
independent models are estimated. 157 
 158 
Secondly, we investigate preference heterogeneity within regions (including the effect 159 
of farmer characteristics) using a random parameter logit model (RPL). The RPL model 160 
overcomes the limitations of a standard multinomial logit model by allowing for 161 
random taste variation, unrestricted substitution patterns, and correlation in unobserved 162 
factors (Train, 2003). Moreover, heterogeneity can be investigated by interacting 163 
individual specific characteristics with attributes or alternative specific constants. In 164 
particular we apply an error component random parameter logit (EC_RPL) approach to 165 
account for correlation over utilities from different alternatives. The EC_RPL model is a 166 
special case of the RPL in which a random error component is used in addition to other 167 
random parameters to identify correlation amongst the non-Status Quo alternatives 168 
(assumed to be normally distributed). This approach allows us to consider the SQ 169 
effect
5
 that it is described as “a systematic inclination of respondents to display a 170 
different attitude towards SQ alternatives from those reserved to alternatives involving 171 
some change, over and beyond what can be captured by the variation of attributes’ 172 
levels across alternatives” (Scarpa et al., 2005).  173 
  174 
                                                 
5 
For a recent review of the SQ effect and an application to the analysis of the influence of choice task 
complexity and attitudes the interested reviewer can refer to Meyerhoff and Liebe (2009). 
 6 
In our case this issue deserves additional consideration as preference for the non-SQ 175 
alternative actually reflects preference for participation in the NFC AES. Since the 176 
status quo was defined as “current farm management” we have to specify different 177 
alternative specific constants (ASC) for AES participants and non-participants. The 178 
utility functions can be specified as: 179 
 180 
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where ASCSQ_NOPAR and ASCSQ_PAR is the non-random Status Quo alternative specific 182 
intercept for non-participants and participants respectively,  is the vector of AES 183 
attributes, ηNON-SQ is the error component which identifies correlation amongst the non-184 
Status Quo alternatives and is assumed to be normally distributed, ηNON-SQ ~ N (0, σ
2
). 185 
The coefficient vector , representing individual tastes, is unobserved and varies 186 
randomly in the population with density f(n|θ), where θ represents the parameters of 187 
this distribution, and γNOPARS and γPARS capture systematic preference heterogeneity as 188 
a function of farmer socioeconomic and farm characteristics (i.e. interaction effects with 189 
the ASCSQ_NOPAR and ASCSQ_PAR respectively). The random terms ε are Gumbel-190 
distributed errors that are specified to be the same for all choices made by the same 191 
individual (panel structure). This breaks away from the assumption of independence in 192 
the error structure across choices made by the same respondent (Scarpa et al., 2005). 193 
For panel data, the probability integrand involves a product of logit formulas (Train, 194 
2003). The joint probability of respondent n choosing alternative i on each of the T 195 
choice occasions is given by: 196 
 197 
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 198 
where, At = {ALTA, ALTB, SQ} is the choice set, λ is a scale parameter, f (β|θ) is the 199 
density of the attributes random parameters, and φ (.) is the normal density of the error 200 
component (ηj) which equals zero when j=SQ. Equation [2] cannot be evaluated 201 
analytically because the choice probability does not have a closed form. Hence it is 202 
approximated using simulation methods, in our case in particular using 1,000 Halton 203 
draws. All attributes are assumed to follow a normal distribution, except for the 204 
payment level attribute which is assumed to be non-random.  205 
 206 
  207 
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 208 
4. RESULTS 209 
The results of the EC_RPL, based on a utility function linear in attributes
6
, are 210 
presented in Table 4.  211 
 212 
All the attribute standard deviations are significant, except for TTA in Andalusia
7
, 213 
indicating that preferences do indeed vary significantly within the population. The 214 
estimated means and standard deviations of the normally distributed coefficients 215 
provide information on the proportion of the population that places a positive value on a 216 
particular attribute and the proportion that places a negative value. For example, 27.0% 217 
of the farmers in Andalusia have a negative preference for the fixed payment attribute 218 
(i.e. they dislike the presence of the FIXED_PREM), while in Aragón, 15.5% of the 219 
respondents exhibit a negative preference for the attribute related to the flexibility on 220 
the surface enrolled.   221 
 222 
The ASCSQ is positive and significant for the sub-sample of non-participants in Aragón 223 
(ASCSQ_NOPAR) and for both participants and non-participants in Andalusia. As this 224 
parameter reflects the probability of not signing up for the proposed AES, this suggests 225 
that farmers are reluctant to change their current farm management. However, in 226 
Aragón farmers appear to be more willing to change, perhaps because they are already 227 
familiar with a variant of the proposed AES. Aversion to changing from the Status Quo 228 
is a common finding in choice experiments, consistent with both rational choice theory 229 
and observed behaviour (Dhar, 1997). Individuals tend to avoid changes in practice for 230 
several reasons (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1998): misperceived sunk costs; regret 231 
avoidance; desire for consistency. Additionally, loss aversion or asymmetric 232 
expectations of costs and benefits has also been put forward as an alternative 233 
explanation for this effect (Kahneman et al., 1991). The non-significance of the 234 
ASCSQ_PAR in the Aragón sample is consistent with these explanations as there is no 235 
major change in practices and farmers already know the costs (and benefits) associated 236 
with their participation in such a scheme. The error component specification, ηNON-SQ, is 237 
also significantly different from zero in both models, therefore different correlation 238 
pattern exists between the unobservable components of utility of the Status Quo 239 
alternative, and those in alternatives involving a change. This is evidence of 240 
heterogeneity across respondents in preferences for Alternative A and Alternative B 241 
compared to the SQ. 242 
  243 
                                                 
6
 When attributes considered are dummy variables only a linear relationship can be represented. In our 
case only the payment level attribute is continuous, however non-linearity was rejected using the Wald 
test (p <0.01). 
7
 The standard deviation of the TTA variable in the Andalusia sample was not significantly different from 
zero, hence the parameter has been assumed as non-random in the final estimation.  
 8 
 244 
 245 
Heterogeneity in preferences across participants and non AES participants is reflected in 246 
the significant coefficients for the interactions between attributes and participation 247 
(GRAZING*PAR and FIXED_PREM*PAR). In the Aragón sample, farmers who are 248 
currently participating in the ACM scheme attach greater value to increased freedom to 249 
graze. These farmers are more likely to have livestock and would further benefit from 250 
the feed provided by the alfalfa crop
8
. However, participants attach less utility to the 251 
Fixed Premium. These farmers have already covered the fixed costs barriers and 252 
transaction costs associated with being in a scheme and, understandably, benefit less 253 
from the fixed payment. In Andalusia, farmers participating in an AES
9
 obtain less 254 
utility from the flexibility of grazing period. This could be explained by the fact that 255 
among participants, 15% have livestock, while among non-participants this proportion 256 
doubles, so that the limitation on grazing has a higher impact on their feed availability. 257 
                                                 
8
 The null hypothesis of independence between livestock production and participating in the ACM can be 
rejected (χ2=30.973: p=0.000). 
9
 As mentioned previously, the 2000-2006 RDP for Andalusia did not include a measure similar to the 
NFC AES and therefore previous participation is considered for any AES in the eligible area.  
Table 4. EC_RPL estimations for the two case study regions 
 Aragón  Andalusia  
 Coeff. SE p-val Coeff. SE p-val 
Mean values 
ASCSQ_NOPAR 6.453 0.715 0.000 13.851 1.524 0.000 
ASCSQ_PAR N.s. N.s. N.s. 11.664 1.373 0.000 
SUR 1.212 0.172 0.000 2.465 0.343 0.000 
GRAZING 0.675 0.218 0.002 3.002 0.445 0.000 
GRAZING*PAR 0.752 0.411 0.067 -1.602 0.908 0.076 
TTA 0.656 0.163 0.000 0.482 0.310 0.120 
FIXED_PREM 1.852 0.182 0.000 1.587 0.462 0.001 
FIXED_PREM*PAR -0.648 0.349 0.064 N.s. 
PREMIUM 0.049 0.003 0.000 0.077 0.009 0.000 
Standard Deviations 
SUR 1.637 0.207 0.000 0.153 0.461 0.001 
GRAZING 1.270 0.256 0.000 2.230 0.532 0.000 
TTA 0.688 0.283 0.015 N.s. 
FIXED_PREM 1.101 0.250 0.000 2.721 0.465 0.000 
ηnon-SQ 1.840 0.261 0.000 1.423 0.520 0.006 
Covariates (socio-economic and technical variables)  
ASCSQ_NOPAR x  ELI_SUR 0.010 0.005 0.000 N.s. 
ASCSQ_NOPAR  x ASOC -0.964 0.641 0.098 N.s. 
ASCSQ_NOPAR  FARM_ABAN  1.650 0.918 0.072 N.s. 
Log-likelihood (β) -1318.335 -659.167 
Log-likelihood (β0) -946.534 -370.814 
χ2 (p-value) 743.601 (0.000) 576.707 (0.000) 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.282 0.437  
No. of observations 1200 600 
N.s.: Not significant. 
ELI_SUR: Eligible surface corresponding to rain-fed non permanent arable land (ha). 
ASOC=Farmer is a member of an agricultural association (1 if yes). 
FARM_ABAN= The farm will be abandoned due to no succession in the farming activity (1 if yes). 
 
 9 
 258 
Additional sources of heterogeneity in preferences were investigated by estimating the 259 
effect of socio-economic and technical factors on preferences for the Status Quo
10
. 260 
These interaction effects are significant only for the subsample of non-AES participants 261 
in Aragón.  The results show that farmers who believe that the farm will be abandoned 262 
in the future (FARM_ABAN) are more likely to choose the Status Quo in Aragón. This 263 
finding is related to the fact that the AES considered implies a significant change in the 264 
farm management compared to other AES in Spain, which have low requirements and 265 
typically involve maintenance of traditional farming practices. The latter have been 266 
found to be preferred mostly by farmers without a successor (Potter and Lobley, 1992). 267 
The negative sign associated with belonging to an agricultural trade-union (ASOC) 268 
highlights the role that social networks have in encouraging participation; a result in line 269 
with the previous research undertaken in the study area (Barreiro-Hurlé et al., 2009). 270 
Finally, farmers with greater eligible area (ELI_SUR) are less willing to participate, 271 
reflecting larger farms’ greater specialization in cereal crops11 and consequent greater 272 
foregone revenue from land enrolled in the AES. However, there is still heterogeneity in 273 
preferences that we have not been able to identify, as reflected by the significant 274 
standard deviations of most attribute parameters. 275 
 276 
The WTA estimates are presented in Table 5. Since all the attributes are normally 277 
distributed and the payment level is fixed, the WTA payments are also normally 278 
distributed and have been estimated using the Delta method for the subsample of 279 
farmers’ participants (Par) and non-participants (Non-Par). The WTA estimate for the 280 
whole sample is calculated as a weighted average based on the actual proportions of 281 
participants and non-participants in the AES, to avoid the bias of over-representation of 282 
participants in the sample. Reported values represent the per hectare premium that 283 
farmers require to be willing to participate in a scheme defined by the evaluated 284 
attributes. Therefore, the WTA payment for the SUR attribute in the Aragón sample 285 
means that if the AES requires enrolment of 50% of the eligible area (as opposed to no 286 
fixed requirement), farmers require an extra 24.6 €/ha to participate.  Alternatively, 287 
farmers would be willing to participate in the NFC AES for a premium reduced by this 288 
amount provided that they have flexibility on the amount of land to be enrolled.  289 
  290 
                                                 
10
 A number of covariates were tested in the EC_RPL, however in the final estimations only the 
covariates that were significant at the 10% level were included. It is worth mentioning that income could 
not be modelled due to the high item-non-response rate for the variable in the survey.  
11 
If we identify the presence of a harvester as an approximation to the cereal specialization, the variable 
ELI_SUR is correlated with an increase in the cereal specialization ( Spearman=0.391, p=0.000). 
 10 
 291 
Table 5. WTA payments in €/ha in the EC_RPL model in the two case studies 
(standard errors in brackets) 
Attribute 
Aragón Andalusia 
Part Non-Part Average Part Non-Part Average 
SUR N.a. N.a. 
24.6
a
 
(3.60) 
N.a. N.a. 
31.9
a,b
 
(4.73) 
GRAZING
*
 
29.0
#
 
(6.82) 
13.7
#
 
(4.48) 
14.2
b
 
(4.36) 
18.1
#
 
(10.77) 
38.8
#
 
(5.61) 
35.4
b
 
(5.23) 
TTA N.a. N.a. 
13.3
b
 
(3.27) 
N.a. N.a. 
6.2
c
 
(3.65) 
FIXED_PREM
*
 
24.5
#
 
(6.37) 
37.6
#
 
(3.95) 
37.3
c
 
(3.86) 
N.a. N.a. 
20.5
a
 
(5.75) 
Part: farmers participating in AES; Non-Part: farmers not participating in AESs; Average: 
weighted average taking into account actual participation rates; N.a.: not applicable as the 
interaction between participation and the attribute is not significant (see Table 4). All values are 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level except TTA in Andalusia which is only significant 
at the 10% level; 
*
: Values significantly different between regions at the 10% level; 
#
: Values 
significantly different between participants and non-participants at the 10% level; 
a,b,c,
: Different 
letters denote significant differences between attributes within a region at the 10% level. 
 292 
Willingness to accept estimates are significantly different between the two regions for 293 
GRAZING and FIXED_PREM. There are also significant differences between 294 
participants and non-participants in both regions. Within each region most WTA 295 
estimates indicate significant heterogeneity amongst those surveyed. There are two 296 
important implications of these results. First, farmers are willing to participate with 297 
lower compensation payments if measures are accompanied by technical support 298 
through advisory services. Compared to the actual AES premium (100 €/ha), this 299 
reduction in compensation payments is close to 13% in Aragón and just over 6% in 300 
Andalusia. Second, there is a clear trade-off between per hectare payments and fixed per 301 
contract payments. Considering that the average enrolled surface for the ACM AES in 302 
Aragón is 15.2 ha incorporating the fixed component in premiums would result in an 303 
average saving per farm enrolled in the scheme of 567 € per year without taking into 304 
account the additional payment made in year zero (the fixed payment). Over the whole 305 
duration of the contract and taking into account a 4% discount rate the net total saving is 306 
1.625 €, representing 23% of the total expenditure for the average farm enrolled.  In 307 
Andalusia, the fixed payment would result in overall savings if farmers enrolled a 308 
minimum of 10.5 hectares in the scheme
12
.  309 
 310 
Preference heterogeneity among regions is not only reflected in significant differences 311 
in the WTA estimates, but also in attribute ranking. Grazing limitation is the most 312 
limiting factor in Andalusia
13
, while the existence of fixed costs not covered by a per 313 
hectare compensation payment limits adoption more in Aragón. In order to provide a 314 
broader picture of the required premiums for specific AES, we also estimate welfare 315 
changes or compensating surplus (CS) related to different policy options using the 316 
formula provided by Hanemann (1984): 317 
  318 
                                                 
12
 When the fixed premium is included, public expenditure in year one is increased by 1,000 € and per 
hectare expenditure could be decreased by 20.5 € ha-1. Therefore to assure a constant expenditure during 
the five year lifespan of the contract, farmers should enrol at least 10.5 hectares. 
13
 However, this could also be due to the fact that the measure in Andalusia restricts grazing all year long 
while in Aragón only during two months. 
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P
UU
CS

)( 10   [3]  
 319 
where P  is the parameter estimate of the premium, and U0 and U1 represent the 320 
farmers’ utility before and after the change under consideration. For this calculation, we 321 
have to assume that utility is linear and separable in attributes.  322 
 323 
Welfare changes are evaluated for two extreme scenarios; one which maximises 324 
environmental benefits
14
; the other where attribute levels are fixed at those preferred by 325 
farmers. Additionally, the current NFC AES design is also included in order to assess 326 
whether the foreseen payment will lead to farmer participation in the measure. Attribute 327 
levels for the three scenarios are presented in Table 6. As the NFC AES was already in 328 
place in Aragón, the Status Quo needs to reflect the initial situation faced by farmers 329 
who are already participating in the AES and those who are not. Therefore, two 330 
alternative U0 levels are defined in Table 6.  331 
 332 
Table 6. Attribute levels for the baseline and the three policy scenarios used in the 
calculation of compensating surplus 
Attribute 
“Status Quo” 
"Environment
” scenario 
“Farmer” 
scenario “Current AES” 
Participants  
in ACM (
1
0U )  
Non- 
participants (
2
0U ) 
SUR Free - 
50% eligible 
surface 
Free Free 
GRAZING Limited - Limited Free Limited 
TTA No - Yes Yes No 
FIXED_PREM No - No Yes No 
 333 
For those farmers already participating in the ACM AES the utility of the current farm 334 
management ( 10U ) takes into account the attribute levels which describe the ACM AES , 335 
while the second Status Quo option ( 20U ) is used in the case of Andalusia and for 336 
farmers not participating in the ACM AES in Aragón. This second Status Quo only 337 
takes into account the ASC. Compensating surplus estimates including standard 338 
deviations obtained by the Delta method are presented in Table 7
15
.  339 
  340 
                                                 
14
 Enrolled area is fixed in order to assure more continuous area enrolled in the NFC AES; grazing is 
limited in order to favour nitrogen incorporation into soil and avoid fires; free technical assistance is 
compulsory in order to assure management practices are correctly applied and monitored; and there is no 
fixed payment allowing for additional funds being available for additional hectares being enrolled or for 
other programmes being implemented. 
15
 Socio-economic and technical characteristics have been included in the utility function for the Status 
Quo option as mean sample values differentiated for participants and non-participants. 
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 341 
Table 7. Compensating surplus for three future AES (€/ha) scenarios (standard errors in 
brackets) 
 Aragón  Andalusia  
Scenario Part Non-Part  Average Part Non-Part Average 
 “Environment” 
11.29  
(4.75)      
-110.89 
(5.30) 
-108.10 
(5.21) 
-144.58 
(6.83) 
-172.85 
(8.49) 
-168.16 
(7.64) 
 “Farmer” 
66.76 
(8.66) 
-34.93 
(8.25) 
-32.08 
(8.05) 
-74.09 
(13.82) 
-81.64 
(10.21) 
-80.39  
(9.75) 
“Current AES” -* 
-99.60 
(5.61) 
- 
-118.94 
(17.66) 
-147.21 
(7.03) 
-142.52 
(6.26) 
Part: farmers participating in AES; Non-Part: farmers not participating in AES; Average: weighted 342 
average based on actual participation rates; * CS for this group cannot be calculated; however it should be 343 
lower than current premium as they are participating in the scheme.  344 
 345 
The CS estimates are significantly different between regions and AES scenarios at the 346 
1% level. The results show that CS values for all the policy scenarios are significantly 347 
different between participants and non-participants in Aragón while in Andalusia 348 
significant differences were only observed for the “environment” scenario.  For the 349 
measure currently included in the Aragón RDP, it can be seen that in Andalusia the 350 
average farmer would not enrol with the proposed premium (100 €/ha), while the 351 
premium for non-enrolled farmers in Aragón is very similar to the current payment. As 352 
far as the evaluated scenarios are concerned, for the Andalusia sample, neither of the 353 
scenarios provides a positive CS value, as the preference for non-participation (reflected 354 
in the ASCSQ) is not compensated by the proposed attribute levels; agri-environmental 355 
payments should be at least €143, €80 and €168 per hectare for the “current AES”, 356 
"farmer" and "environment" scenarios respectively. Therefore, only in the “farmer” 357 
scenario is participation predicted with the current premium payment (100 €/ha). 358 
However, as this scenario includes a fixed payment, at least 10 hectares per contract
16
 359 
should be enrolled in order to ensure the same expenditure per farmer. An interesting 360 
result for Aragón is that for current participants, the “environment” and the “farmer” 361 
scenario would both be accepted without additional compensation, as participants are 362 
better-off. 363 
 364 
 365 
5. CONCLUSIONS 366 
 367 
The main objective of this study was to investigate the role that Agri-Environmental 368 
Scheme (AES) design characteristics have on farmers’ participation. A choice 369 
experiment was conducted in two Spanish regions to investigate farmers’ preferences 370 
for several important elements of the design of an AES requiring cultivation of rain-fed 371 
nitrogen fixing crops. This measure can be considered an example of an AES promoting 372 
extensification and the study areas represent low-input low-output agricultural systems. 373 
Design attributes considered included increasing flexibility for grazing limitations, 374 
requirement for a minimum enrolled area, compulsory technical assistance and 375 
monitoring and the implementation of a fixed payment per contract. 376 
 377 
                                                 
16
 Without taking into account the discount rate, in the “farmer” scenario expenditure per farmer 
corresponds to: 80.4 €/ha*5 years*number of ha +1000 €/contract and in the current AES scheme equals 
to: 100 €/ha*number of ha *5 years. Therefore the number of ha enrolled that equals both expenditures is 
10.2 ha. 
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Results show that farmers are willing to participate for lower compensation in 378 
programmes that allow the maintenance of agricultural activity (i.e. grazing in enrolled 379 
surface) and do not impose stringent restrictions on farm management (i.e. enrolment of 380 
at least 50% of eligible land). However, if policy makers consider that these attributes 381 
need to be compulsory to achieve the desired environmental benefits, then higher 382 
payments could be offered to induce farmers to participate. In our case, substantial 383 
savings can be obtained by including a fixed component per contract in the AES 384 
premium. This is confirmed both in the region where the measure is already in place, 385 
where savings could be as high as 23% and in the region where the measure is not in 386 
place, where savings would be realised by using the fixed payment as long as farmers 387 
enrol at least 10.5 hectares per contract. Provision of compulsory technical assistance 388 
and monitoring can also be used to reduce the premiums necessary to secure 389 
participation. This design feature would provide a three-way benefit as it lowers the 390 
cost, increases the probability of delivering the environmental benefits and includes an 391 
element of scheme monitoring to ensure adherence to prescribed farming practices.  392 
 393 
Significant differences in results are observed between regions and amongst farmers. 394 
Although there is no difference in the direction of preferences between regions, the 395 
preference ranking of attributes does differ. While a shift to the preferred AES design 396 
features will lead to savings in both regions, region specific measures are needed to 397 
maximise savings. These results imply that a regional approach to AES design is 398 
appropriate both from the perspective of potential savings that can be made and cost-399 
effectiveness. Preference heterogeneity across regions may be due to several factors 400 
(e.g. farm and farmer characteristics, institutional setting, environmental attitudes). Our 401 
results suggest that spatial heterogeneity may be linked to previous participation in a 402 
similar scheme (e.g. in Aragón a similar AES has been in place since 2001). Of course, 403 
several factors underlie differences in preference across regions and this may be an 404 
interesting subject for further research. Heterogeneity among farmers within a region is 405 
mainly attributed to previous experience with AES, which reduces the reluctance to 406 
participate in any given programme and the compensation required.  Additionally, our 407 
results show that participation is also influenced by farm and farmer specific 408 
characteristics.  409 
 410 
Our findings have important implications for the design of AES aimed at delivering 411 
environmental benefits in marginal dry-land areas through the introduction of nitrogen 412 
fixing crops in the crop rotation. The main recommendation is that, as long as the main 413 
environmental objectives are met, relaxing the grazing restriction could lead to 414 
significant increase in farmer up-take at lower budgetary costs since farmers would be 415 
willing to participate for less compensation. Moreover, including a fixed component in 416 
the compensation premium could reduce overall contract costs. In general, it can be 417 
argued that more flexibility in AES management prescriptions is needed to encourage 418 
greater farmer participation. In this sense approaches such as those used in the UK 419 
where farmers can choose the most suitable combination of practices to achieve 420 
specified levels of environmental benefits (Hodge and Reader, 2007) are expected to be 421 
more cost-effective.  Potential savings can be up to 70% in some of the AES policy 422 
scenarios evaluated.  423 
 424 
Our results suggest new avenues for research. A key issue is to identify which farmers 425 
show negative preferences for specific attributes, which would allow better targeting of 426 
design features among different groups of farmers. Moreover, our results should be 427 
 14 
corroborated with other measures, since factors affecting actual participation have been 428 
found to vary with the type of measure (Barreiro-Hurlé et al., 2008). An area for further 429 
research would be to compare WTA payments with costs and benefits of the proposed 430 
changes in AES design. For example, if the additional premium required by farmers to 431 
enrol a fixed amount of land in a particular AES (e.g. 50% of the eligible surface) is 432 
lower than the environmental gain derived from the potential increase in the amount of 433 
land enrolled in AES, then this requirement would lead to net social gains.  434 
 435 
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